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# JUN 1 2 2020

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk

Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 20-MPS Lic/DCB R0

20-170

Docket No.

50-423

License No.

NPF-49

DOMINION ENERGY NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2020-003-00
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON LOW
CONDENSER VACUUM

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2020-003-00 documenting an event at Millstone Power Station Unit 3, on April 13, 2020. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Jeffry A. Langan at (860) 444-5544.

Sincerely,

John R. Daugherty

Site Vice President - Millstone

Attachments:

License Event Report 2020-003-00

Commitments made in this letter: None

IEZZ NRR

Serial No. 20-170 Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 2020-003-00 Page 2 of 2

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Serial No. 20-170 Docket No. 50-423 Licensee Event Report 2020-003-00

## **ATTACHMENT**

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2020-003-00 REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON LOW CONDENSER VACUUM

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION ENERGY NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/">http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/</a>)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-6 A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (3150-0104), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: <a href="mailto:oing-auchine-mailto:oing-auchine

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NRC FORM 366A

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

(04-2020)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 04/30/2020

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1. FACILITY NAME		2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER					
Millstone Power Station Unit 3	05000423	2. BOOKET NOMBER	YEAR 2020	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REV NO.		
			2020	- 003	-	00		

#### **NARRATIVE**

#### 1.EVENT DESCRIPTION

At 15:50 on 4/13/2020, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) operating in Mode 1 at approximately 82% reactor power, an automatic reactor trip occurred following a turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum caused by the trip of multiple circulating water pumps.

At approximately 12:42 in anticipation of increasing wind speed and degrading intake conditions, the plant completed a downpower to approximately 82% power to facilitate condenser backwashing. Throughout the afternoon, severe winds blew a significant amount of seaweed into the MPS3 Intake structure and onto the intake travelling screens, with carry-over fouling screenwash strainer baskets and condenser Inlet water boxes. The intake conditions were being managed by the operations crew with condenser vacuum at approximately 2.8 inhg. Over a period of approximately 4 minutes conditions rapidly degraded. At 15:44 the 'B' screen wash pump tripped on high-high strainer differential pressure, followed 38 seconds later by a trip of the 'A' screen wash pump on high-high strainer differential pressure. The loss of screenwash spray to the travelling screens resulted in increasing level differential across the travelling screens. At 15:48, the 'B' circulating water pump tripped on high screen differential level, followed 55 seconds later by a trip of the 'E' circulating water pump. The loss of two circulating water pumps resulted in rapidly degrading condenser vacuum, followed by a turbine trip on low vacuum, and an automatic reactor trip due to the turbine trip.

All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. Main feedwater was isolated as designed following the trip, and auxiliary feedwater actuated automatically. The operating crew shifted decay heat removal from the condenser to the atmospheric steam dumps due to decreasing reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature and in anticipation of complete removal of all circulating water pumps due to no screen wash pumps running. All other systems responded as expected to the trip.

The actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of systems listed in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

#### 2. CAUSE

The direct cause of the reactor trip was a turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum. The low condenser vacuum trip was caused by rapidly degrading environmental conditions that overcame the capacity of the screen wash system leading to a trip of both screen wash pumps and two circulating water pumps.

NRC FORM 366A (04-2020) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION

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SHEET

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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER				
	05000423	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.		
Millstone Power Station Unit 3	33300.20	2020	- 003	<b>-</b> 00		

#### **NARRATIVE**

#### 3. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

The plant response to this trip was bounded by the FSAR chapter 15.2.5 Loss of Condenser Vacuum safety analysis. The safety analysis event does not credit the reactor trip on turbine trip but rather credits the safety grade high pressurizer pressure trip. The plant was operating at 82% rated thermal power (RTP) rather than the 102% RTP assumed in the safety analysis. Additionally, not credited in the safety analysis, the steam generator atmospheric relief valves were available for steam relief. The loss of condenser vacuum experienced was less adverse than the event as described in the FSAR. The review of the trip concluded that no safety functions were challenged, and plant operation was maintained well within the bounds of the FSAR Chapter 15 Safety Analysis. All systems required to shut down the reactor and maintain safe shutdown, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident were available.

#### 4. CORRECTIVE ACTION

The screen wash system strainers were cleaned, and the screen wash system was returned to service, allowing debris to be removed from the travelling screens, and differential level to be restored to normal. All circulating water pumps were restored, and condenser vacuum reestablished at 14:10 on 4/14/2020.

Additional corrective actions to improve the screen wash and circulating water system's operation under severe environmental conditions are being evaluated in accordance with the station's corrective action program.

### **5.PREVIOUS OCCURENCES**

No similar plant trips due to excessive biofouling of the intake structure systems over the past 4 years.

### 6. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) Codes

Circulating water pumps KE, P Screen wash pumps MD, P Screen wash strainer MD, STR Main condenser SG, COND